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Abstract
We present a realistic and novel micro-structure for the market for ath-
letes in league sports. In our trading mechanism the clubs bid for individual
players, internalizing the e¤ect that a player not hired might play for the
competition. For inelastic talent supply, our (wage-minimizing) equilibrium
supports the Coasian results of Rottenberg (1956) and Fort and Quirk (1995):
talent allocation is independent of initial ownership and revenue sharing
arrangements. When talent supply is elastic, revenue sharing decreases the
aggregate amount of talent hired. This negative e¤ect on the talent level may
be e¢ ciency enhancing when the competition for talent results in excess tal-
ent being hired. For the rst time in the literature, we carry out our entire
analysis using a newly formulated, unied club objective, incorporating both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benets.
We are grateful for comments from Philipp Kircher, Paul Madden and Fred Palomino.
yInstitute for Economic Analysis, CSIC, and Barcelona GSE
zThe University of Edinburgh
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1 Introduction
Despite the increasing economic signicance of the sports industry,1 the literature
on the economics of sport  kicked o¤ by Rottenberg (1956)  continues to be
largely absent from core journals of economics. The biased view of many editors
and referees that sport is just a game, can be only partly blamed for this. More
importantly, while there is a generally accepted overall view of the peculiarities
of the labor market in this industry nicely crystallized by Rosen and Sanderson
(2001) , less headway has been made in formal theoretical analysis that not only
supports the empirical observations, but can provide generalizable insights for the
wider discipline. In this paper we take a step in that direction, putting forward a set
of original modelling choices, which together form a basic microstructure of the labor
market in sports. This structure is amenable to be built upon with the introduction
of further institutional details. At the same time, there is general insight that can be
learnt from its generic version, which is transferable to other industries that exhibit
oligopolistic competition in both input and output markets.2
Two competing views as to clubs objectives have dominated the sports eco-
nomics arena since the early days. On the one hand, and more popular among
American scholars, it is postulated that clubs maximize prots, just as most rms
do. On the other hand, starting with Neale (1964), it has been argued that clubs
owned by a benefactoror by a large number of memberswho do not receive
dividends, as is often the case with European clubs do not maximize prots. The
usual way of modelling these utility maximizingclubs (c.f. Sloane, 1971) is that
they hire all the talent they can a¤ord. As the rst approach leads to a rst-order
condition, while the second one is determined by a budget constraint, they often
1For example, according to Sport England: "In 2010, sport and sport-related activity generated
Gross Value Added (GVA) of £ 20.3 billion ($30 billion) 1.9% of the England total. This placed
sport within the top 15 industry sectors in England and larger than sale and repair of motor
vehicles, insurance, telecoms services, legal services and accounting." And this is before taking into
account the savings in health care costs, estimated at $16 billion.
2As an example, our model of the labor market could be easily adapted to the market for CEOs,
and contribute to an explanation of why they are overpaid.
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lead to drastically di¤erent conclusions, even in terms of comparative statics. Our
rst contribution is to unify the two types of objective function.
Our fundamental observation is that both benefactors and supporter-owned clubs
have alternative uses for money that also provide them with utility. A magnate
might wish to buy a yacht, a members club might want to subsidize its other
activities/teams. This fact implies that rather than an inexible (budget) constraint,
what the club has to factor into its decision is the shadow utility or opportunity
cost  of money spent on the team. This construct allows the club to trade o¤
utility against money, typically leading to an interior solution. As a result, we can
postulate a general objective function, incorporating both prot and/or non-prot
criteria, and still use the rst-order approach.
Next, we turn to modelling the player market. What complicates matters is
that in this decentralized market, the clubs cannot unilaterally decide the amount
of talent they hire: that is jointly determined by the actions of all clubs. It is their
strategic interaction that leads to the nal talent allocation.3 Note that an essential
characteristic of a sports league is that the clubs are interacting in two di¤erent
markets. Not only are they competing for the players, but they are also engaged
in a tournament and in fact, in joint production on the eld/pitch/court. As a
result, the willingness to pay of a club for an additional player depends on where this
player would go if she were not hired by the club. In a two-team league, one could
say that if the supply of talent is low/inelastic then the player will go with the rival,
while otherwise it will be unemployed (c.f. Madden, 2011, for a continuous version
of this scheme). However, this approach clearly breaks down if there are more than
two clubs in the league. Moreover, the fundamental issue is that clubs would like
to and, in practice, do a¤ect whether or not they are in direct competition with
another club for a player.
We thus posit a market, where clubs can make personalized o¤ers to players.
3Alternatively, a club could unilaterally decide how much to spend on players (c.f. Madden,
2015b). However, it is unclear how such a game could be implemented in the absence of an
invisible hand.
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In actual fact, this may involve complicated forms of multilateral negotiations, but
for simplicity we model it as a collection of simultaneous sealed-bid auctions,
where the clubs bid competitively for individual players.4 We show that this highly
decentralized market does not lead to much additional analytical complexity, as
the bidding equilibrium always leads to a single wage paid/o¤ered to all hired units
of talent. The nature of equilibria is determined by the clubsdemand functions. All
the conceptual complications stem from the endogenous nature of these: how much
a club values an extra unit of talent depends not just on its own talent level but on
the distribution of talent across clubs at which we wish to evaluate this marginal
e¤ect.
When calculating a clubs willingness to pay for another player, given the other
clubsbids, we have to consider two scenarios: the new player may be attracted away
from a rival club in the case of contestedplayers, who receive an acceptable o¤er
from at least two clubs or, on the contrary, she may be hired from the pool of
non-employed talent in the case of uncontestedplayers, where the other clubs
do not compete for them. As it turns out, in most cases,5 all the hired players are
contested: on the one hand, presented with a choice, a club would rather weaken a
rival, while on the other hand, even if a club would wish to do so, there is no way to
retain exclusive dealing with a player. Consequently, demand and wages incorporate
the external e¤ect that hiring a player will not simply add her productivity to the
team but it will also subtract her productivity from a competitor.
Finally, we show that revenue sharing simply dampens the incentives to hire
talent, with no e¤ect on its allocation. This does not leave us without a motive
4In Burguet and Sákovics (2016), we use the same bidding model to analyze the competition
for inputs among oligopolists. In that paper we concentrate on the wage enhancing e¤ects of com-
petitive foreclosure, the possibility of unemployment when labor supply is inelastic, the relevance
of (non)anonymity, and we also incorporate multiple industries.
De Fraja and Sákovics (2001) also consider the possibility of competitive bidding in a decentral-
ized market, but they have a random matching environment, rather than targeted o¤ers.
Palomino and Sákovics (2004) consider both targeted bidding and externalities, but they have
a single player in each team.
5It is not always the case as competitive balance considerations may overcome the usual e¤ect.
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for intervention though: since the clubs coordinate on bidding for the same players,
they may compete too ercely, even from a social welfare point of view. As revenue
sharing softens the competition, it may be welfare improving.
2 Club objectives
Let us esh out our argument for a unied club objective by formalizing the two
traditional views on it, together with the one we wish to put forward.6 The in-
gredients are: the amount of talent hired by the club, t; the distribution of talent
in the league, t; an exogenous budget (which may include future income), B; a
revenue function, R(t); a cost function, C(t); a utility function measuring the non-
pecuniary benets derived from the hired talent, U(t); and a (strictly increasing)
indirect utility function measuring the utility derived from the next-best use of
money, V ($). We assume additive separability of the two utility functions, and
normalize R(0; :) = C(0) = U(0; :) = 0.
The traditional formulations are straightforward:
Prot maximization: maxt [R(t)  C(t)]equivalently,maxt [B +R(t)  C(t)];
F.O.C. : @R(t)
@t
= C 0(t).
Utility maximization: maxt U(t) s.t. B+R(t) C(t)  0. For any increasing
U(:), the solution requires a binding budget constraint, B +R(t)  C(t) = 0.
We propose a unied formulation, where a clubs objective is the sum of its
non-pecuniary benet from hiring talent, U(t), and of the additional benet that it
achieves by spending its net money holding, B +R(t)  C(t), elsewhere. That is,
Our unied approach: maxt [U(t) + V (B +R(t)  C(t))]; F.O.C. :
@U(t)
@t
= V 0 (B +R(t)  C(t)) (C 0(t)  @R(t)
@t
): (1)
Looking at (1), note that V 0 measures the marginal utility of an extra unit of
6For simplicity, we assume that all the expected revenue can be invested in talent: there are no
credit constraints. This assumption might be relevant for our negative result on revenue sharing.
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money, and C 0   @R(t)
@t
is the money an extra unit of talent costs the club. At the
optimal choice, the product of these two values must, therefore, equal the marginal
utility from an additional unit of talent.
It is immediate that, since V (:) is increasing, when non-pecuniary e¤ects are
not present U(:)  0 the new formulation leads to the same solution as prot
maximization. To recover utility maximization, we would need to make tortuous
assumptions on V to recreate the notion of a binding (in both directions) budget
constraint (e.g. that V is zero for non-negative values but it is minus innity for
negative ones).
Condition (1) can be rewritten as
@R(t)
@t
+
@U(t)
@t
V 0(B +R(t)  C(t)) = C
0(t): (2)
When the club maximizes prots, the optimal (interior) solution equates the
marginal cost of one more unit of talent to the marginal revenue it brings to the
club. In general, in our unied approach, the optimal solution equates the marginal
cost of one more unit of talent to the marginal increase in the clubsobjectives.
The left hand side of (2) can be viewed as a modied revenuefunction, one that
includes not only the direct revenue e¤ect of one more unit of talent, but also the
(non-pecuniary) e¤ect on the utility of members/owners, measured in money terms,
where the exchange rate between money and utility is given by V 0(B+R(t) C(t)).
If neither risk aversion nor wealth e¤ects are signicant, the slope of the indirect
utility function, V 0(:), may be approximated with a constant in the relevant range.7
We will maintain this assumption throughout the rest of the paper. It will allow us
to work with a crisp model of wage determination and talent allocation that focuses
on the interaction between clubs without having to disentangle these interactions
from less informative income e¤ects. We will then come back to these e¤ects when
we discuss revenue sharing in Section 5.
Despite allowing for the objectives of the club to include both utility and prot
7See Friedman and Sákovics (2015) for a detailed motivation and analysis of a similar model in
a consumer choice context.
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considerations, we will continue to refer to the primitive with respect to its own
talent of the left hand side of (2), Z(t) := R(t) + U(t)=V 0, as the revenues.8
Note that, given our formulation of Z(t), not only is there no budget constraint
(V 0 is capturing borrowing costs instead) but there is also no individual rational-
ity constraint: Z(t)   C(t) = 0 has no special economic meaning. The outside
opportunities are embodied in the indirect utility function.
3 A simple model of the player market
On the supply side, we assume that there is a continuum of talent of measure T ,
available for hire at (or above) a reservation wage of r per unit.9 In order to avoid
technical di¢ culties arising from indivisibilities, we do not explicitly model athletes
incorporating di¤erent measures of talent. Instead, we treat each innitesimal unit
of talent as a separate entity that is, a playerin our market game. The wage of
an athlete embodying several units of talent can be calculated as the sum (integral)
of the wages of each unit. As it turns out, each unit will be paid the same wage in
equilibrium, so aggregation is easy.
The demand comes from two competing clubs,10 whose payo¤s depend on the
distribution of acquired talent. In particular, if ti units of talent are hired by Club
i, it earns revenue Zi(ti; t3 i), for i = 1; 2.11 Then, the payo¤ functions are
Zi(ti; t3 i)  Ci, where Ci is Club is wagebill (for simplicity, its only cost). We do
not write Ci(ti) not even Ci(ti; t3 i) for the wagebill, to emphasize that the cost
of hiring ti units of talent is endogenous, even conditional on t3 i, as it depends on
8Madden (2015a) proposes a similar functional form but without the microfoundations we
provide.
9For simplicity, we assume that all players have the same reservation wage. It is straightfor-
ward to generalize to an increasing supply function. In fact, with reservation wage dispersion the
incentives to bid for the same the low r players is even greater, see below.
10For claritys sake we describe our framework for a two-team league. The generalization to
more teams is conceptually straightforward.
11For ease of exposition, we assume that the revenue functions are twice di¤erentiable in both
arguments.
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the clubsbidding behavior in the player market. To retain generality and focus, we
treat the relationship between talent distribution and revenues as a black box, and
will simply make a few restrictions on the functional form of Zi.
Before putting forward our assumptions on how the payo¤s vary as a function
of the nal talent allocation, we describe how talent gets hired.
Each Club i, simultaneously, sets a deterministic and Lebesgue measurable
wage schedule, Wi(),  2 [0; T ], specifying an individual wage o¤er to each12
player. Players then accept the highest bid above their reserve wage that they have
received if any. Note that this is conceptually equivalent to each (innitesimal)
player holding a rst-price auction with a reserve price of r. Importantly, the clubs
are committed to honor all the o¤ers they have made (if accepted).
When, in a hypothetical equilibrium, all the talent is contested, holding Club
js bids xed, Club is revenues can be written as a function of a single variable,
its own talent level, ti: Zi(ti; T   ti). This follows from the fact that any player
Club i does not hire will play for Club j. Club is willingness to pay for a marginal
unit of talent is equal to its marginal revenue (c.f. (2)), given by dZ
i(ti;T ti)
dti
=
@Zi(ti;T ti)
@ti
  @Zi(ti;T ti)
@t3 i
= Zi1(ti; T   ti) Zi2(ti; T   ti). We assume that this residual
demand function is downward sloping (c.f. Remark 1, below).
When Zi2 < 0, the residual demand exceeds Z
i
1, as the club internalizes the e¤ect
poaching a player from the opponent has on its revenues. Note that Zi2 could be
positive only if the competitive balance is so much tilted in favor of Club i that it
would prefer its rivals talent level to rise. Since the competitive balance cannot
possibly be tilted in favor of both clubs, we can safely assume:
Assumption 1 If Zi2(ti; t3 i) > 0, then Z
3 i
2 (t3 i; ti) < 0, i = 1; 2.
When Club i considers bidding for an uncontested player, its marginal willingness
to pay for an additional unit of talent, given that t3 i units of talent would currently
12We require that each player receive an o¤er for mathematical simplicity. If a club wishes not
to make an o¤er to some players, we model it as it o¤ering them a wage below r.
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be hired by the rival, is again equal to its marginal revenue, which then is simply
dZi(ti;t3 i)
dti
= Zi1(ti; t3 i). We assume that this residual demand function is also
downward sloping for all t3 i and ti < T   t3 i.
Remark 1 The fact that marginal revenue is strictly decreasing in ti represents
that the incentive to attract a player away from the rival is decreasing in the amount
of talent the club has already hired. This assumption is standardly made in the
literature for the entire support of ti, just as we have done. There are two points
worth discussion. First, our revenue function is a more complex object than usual,
consisting of both a monetary (R) and a non-monetary (U=V 0) part. For their sum to
be concave, a su¢ cient condition is that both of these functions are concave. Second,
in practice it is likely that for small ti marginal revenue is actually increasing (an
issue rst pointed out in Madden, 2010): when ti is small (and all talent is employed)
competitive balance is low, so the pie to divide is small, so  as the e¤ect of an
extra unit of talent on the winning probability is also small the combined e¤ect is
small and therefore smaller than when competitive balance is high. A non-monotonic
marginal revenue function will lead to a residual demand function with jumps. This
is because for any given price the demand is always on the marginal revenue function
but when there are multiple talent distributions leading to the same MR, there is one
of them selected (the one maximizing Zi(ti; T   ti)  pti or Zi(ti; t3 i)  pti). Thus,
in the likely case that the MR curve is single-peaked, we would have a minimum
viable scale(MVS), given by the talent level maximizing MR.13 For no talent price
will (residual) demand be positive but less than MVSi.
4 Characterization
We now turn to the analysis of the model. Our rst result proved in the Appendix
 shows that despite the exibility available to wage discriminate, in equilibrium
13Note that in our model it is the marginal, not the average revenue function, that determines
the MVS. Apart from the conceptual di¤erence, this also implies a lower MVS as the MR curve
must already be decreasing at the peak of the AR curve.
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not only does each club pay the same wage to all of its players,14 but the wages paid
by the two clubs equalize as well.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, (almost) all talent hired is paid the same wage per
unit.
An intuitive way of seeing this remarkable result is to note that each club must
be willing to make the same o¤er  its marginal willingness to pay for attracting
a player away from its competitor to each player it is competitively bidding for,
as the maximization problem, given the expected outcome in the other auctions, is
exactly the same. Next, note that, in equilibrium, any uncontested player who is
hired must be paid r. Therefore, there is necessarily competition for each player
paid above r, taking us to a common wage across all.
4.1 Equilibrium
Because of the personalized nature of o¤ers, the equilibria of our game involve a
great deal of coordination. Unsurprisingly, this may lead to multiplicity. Therefore,
to ensure that our comparative statics exercises are meaningful, we need to select
a unique equilibrium. To this end, in our main proposition we characterize the
market solution, assuming that whenever multiple equilibria exist, the clubs coor-
dinate on the one with the lowest wage. Besides being a focal extremeof the set
of equilbria that is always well dened, this selection has an additional, convenient
feature: it is the only equilibrium that does not involve involuntarily unemployed15
players. As we will see later, in any other equilibrium, some players who would
strictly prefer to be employed at the marketwage are not hired.
In order to ensure that the equilibrium selection is consistent across di¤erent
revenue functions, we need to make a further restriction. The following assumption
14Recall, that the correct interpretation is that the wage per e¢ ciency unit of talent is equalized.
15Recall, that not being hired by either club need not mean that the player is literally unem-
ployed. For example, a basketball player not hired by the NBA might play in Europe (or a lower
league, say, ABA 2000). Nonetheless, for ease of exposition we will label them as unemployed.
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is su¢ cient.
Assumption 2 Zi12(ti; t3 i)  Zi22(ti; t3 i) < 0, for all (ti; t3 i) and i = 1; 2.
In words, we require that the marginal valuation for hiring a contested player be
decreasing in the rivals talent level. As we will see, this guarantees that a decrease
in the aggregate talent level leads to higher market wages.
Let (t; T   t) be the market clearingtalent distribution when all players are
contested, dened as the talent distribution that equates inverse contested demands:
the by the assumed monotonicity unique solution to Z11(t; T   t) Z12(t; T   t) =
Z21(T   t; t)  Z22(T   t; t). Denote the corresponding wage by
w = Z11(t
; T   t)  Z12(t; T   t): (3)
Proposition 2 Unless the reservation wage is prohibitively high, there exists an
equilibrium with wage maxfw; rg. When w > r, this equilibrium leads to full
employment and t1 = t, t2 = T  t. When w  r, the equilibrium talent allocation
(t1; t2) is such that
max

Zi1(ti; t3 i)  Zi2(ti; t3 i); Zi1(ti; t3 i)
	
= r; i = 1; 2; (4)
whenever r is su¢ ciently low so that a solution to (4) exists. Moreover, when
Assumption 2 is satised, there exists no equlibrium with a lower wage.
The outcome displayed by Proposition 2 (when w > r) is similar to the one often
put forward in the literature ever since El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971). Our innovations
are still fourfold: i) we extend the result to utility maximization; ii) we explicitly
incorporate the external e¤ects; iii) we extend to the important16 case of w  r;
and iv) we derive the outcome as the equilibrium of a strategic market game.
16Note that when talent supply is an increasing function with large/innite support, the equilib-
rium level of aggregate talent is not a corner solution and wage is equal to the marginal reservation
wage, making this the relevant scenario.
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When w > r, in our equilibrium, both clubs o¤er the equilibrium wage 
equalling their marginal revenue  to (almost) all players and the players accept
each clubs o¤er with the probability corresponding to the equilibrium proportion of
talent hired by that club, ti=T .17 Since w > r implies that the aggregate demand
for contested players exceeds supply, there is no opportunity to hire any uncontested
player and the equilibrium is characterized via the willingness to pay for contested
players.18 As all the players that are hired are contested, each club knows that if it
lets a player go, this player will end up playing for the other team. It is as if there
was a technological constraint requiring that trades can only happen between clubs.
Thus, we have proved that Rottenberg/Coase were right:
Corollary 1 When w > r,19 the nal allocation of talent will be the same as
if clubs started with arbitrarily sharing the ownership of players, but they were
allowed to frictionlessly trade among themselves.
To see that there is no other equilibrium with a lower wage, note that the only
other possibility would require that less talent is hired. However, by Assumption 2,
the marginal revenue is increasing in the level of unemployment, leading to higher
wages.
When w  r, two di¤erences arise. First, it may no longer be possible to hire all
the talent in equilibrium. Second, one of the clubs may prefer and manage to hire
uncontested players. When only the rst e¤ect is active (both clubs have a higher
17Alternatively, di¤erent players could accept with di¤erent probabilities, as long as the aggregate
probabilities of acceptance are ti=T .
18Recall that this willingness to pay includes the value of attracting a player away from the rival
and therefore the equilibrium wage is higher than the one normally interpreted from the literature,
where the revenue functions have a single parameter (own talent level).
19Note that w > r, is only a su¢ cient condition. The only scenario where the equivalence breaks
down is where there are uncontested players hired in equilibrium. For that to happen, we must
have that the marginal benet of hiring an unemployed worker is higher than attracting one away
from the rival. That is, the concerns about aggregate revenue must outweigh the concerns about
performance on the pitch. For example, when the revenues are shared in a non-performance-related
manner. See Section 5.
12
contested than uncontested demand at the equilibrium values), the equilibrium is as
before, except that not all players will receive an o¤er: r = Z11(t1; t2)  Z12(t1; t2) =
Z21(t2; t1)   Z22(t2; t1) and the players who receive o¤ers accept Club is one with
probability ti
t1+t2
. When uncontested demand plays a role, the wage must equal r.
We may have one club hiring uncontested players only, but also making o¤ers to
other players, who nonetheless choose to work for the rival club, which only hires
contested players.20
As we have already mentioned, the outcome discussed in Proposition 2 need not
be the unique equilibrium outcome.21 First, under certain conditions, there also
exist equilibria with involuntary unemploymentwhere wages exceed r but some
players are not hired (despite homogeneity of talent). These equilibria result from
a coordination game the clubs coordinate on who to make an o¤er to and as
such there are a continuum of them, whenever they exist. Second, when w  r,
there may be more than one equilibrium, always with wage r, as the system of two
equations for t1 and t2 in the second part of the proposition may have more than
one solution.
As we have also anticipated, the equilibrium selection in Proposition 2 makes it
possible to discuss an important comparative statics exercise: revenue sharing. We
turn to that next.
5 Revenue sharing
One of the most debated questions with regard to the player market (c.f. Fort
and Quirk, 1995) is whether teams with high revenues should be forced to share
them with poorer teams presumably in order to increase the overall quality of
20Market sharing  i.e., each club targeting a di¤erent set ot players  cannot be equilibrium
since that would require that R2 be positive for both clubs, which contradicts Assumption 1.
21Though it is easy to nd su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness. All that is needed is that the
uncontested demand of one of the clubs (at wage r) exceed the amount of (contested) talent it
is supposed to hire in any hypothetical equilibrium with unemployment. Thus, if t(E) solves
Z11 (t; E   t) = Z21 (E   t; t), and we let w = minE Z11 (t; T   t), then w > r is su¢ cient.
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the league (taking into account competitive balance considerations). The resolution
of the problem of optimal revenue sharing could also help in determining whether
imposing the collective sale of TV rights a procedure which makes redistribution
much more practical  is a good idea.22 We cannot provide a full answer in this
paper, but we wish to highlight a few implications of our approach.
Let us denote the net revenues accrued to Club i after revenue sharing by Si,
and consider a simple revenue sharing scheme, where a proportion 1    of each
clubs (monetary) revenues is transferred to the rival. That is, taking into account
non-pecuniary and therefore non-transferable benets:
S1(t1; t2; ) =
U1(t1; t2)
V 01
+ R1(t1; t2) + (1  )R2(t2; t1); (5)
S2(t2; t1; ) =
U2(t2; t1)
V 02
+ R2(t2; t1) + (1  )R1(t1; t2):
Note that  = 1 corresponds to no revenue sharing, while at the other extreme,
 = 1=2 captures full sharing of the (expropriable) revenues. We may dene the
analogue of w when these are the new revenuefunctions, as
w() = S11(t

1; T   t1; )  S12(t1; T   t1; ) = (6)
S21(T   t1; t1; )  S22(T   t1; t1; ):
The following irrelevance result generalizes Fort and Quirk (1995):
Proposition 3 As long as w() > r and everyone is hired, revenue sharing has
no e¤ect on the talent distribution, while it decreases the market wage: w() =
w(1)  (1  )

dR1(t1();T t1())
dt1
  dR2(T t1();t1())
dt1

.
When all talent is hired, the only e¤ect of revenue sharing is to redistribute
revenue from players to clubs. That revenue sharing does not a¤ect the allocation
of talent follows from the combined e¤ect of two things. One is that it is the
marginal revenues being equal that denes equilibrium. The other is the fact that
in equilibrium all players are contested, implying that the marginal increase of one
22See Falconieri et al. (2004).
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clubs talent level leads to the same marginal decrease of that of the other club
( @ti
@t3 i
=  1). Together, these imply that the change in the marginal revenue of
Club i as a result of receiving a transfer e.g. (1   )R3 i as in revenue sharing
as dened above is the marginal e¤ect of increasing its talent level on the revenue
transferred from the other team, which is exactly the same as  1 times the e¤ect
of increasing Club 3  is talent level would have been on the same revenue:
dR3 i
dti
=
@R3 i
@ti
+
@R3 i
@t3 i
 @t3 i
@ti
= (7)
@R3 i
@ti
  @R
3 i
@t3 i
=  

@R3 i
@ti
 @ti
@t3 i
+
@R3 i
@t3 i

=  dR
3 i
dt3 i
:
Thus, the transferred revenue has exactly the same (negative) e¤ect on the marginal
revenues of both the giving and the receiving team. Therefore, if the marginal
revenues were equal to start with for a given talent distribution (in the equilibrium
before the transfer), they will continue to be so following redistribution (so the same
talent distribution still leads to equilibrium after the transfer).23
As the clubsincentives to win and thus their willingness to pay for talent are
unambiguously reduced by revenue-sharing, wages are lower the fuller the revenue
sharing arrangement is.
When not all talent is hired, revenue sharing may also a¤ect the aggregate
amount of talent hired by the league. Since clubs are less willing to pay for tal-
ent for a given total amount of talent in the league , this should be expected to
lead to lower demand for talent, and so less talent hired by the league. Needless to
say, when the amount of talent that one club hires changes, this also changes the
other clubs willingness to pay for talent. Therefore, the talent-reducing e¤ect does
not dominate for all revenue functions.
23The reason why it has been claimed that the irrelevance result does not hold with utility
maximizingclubs is that in those models demand is not determined by marginal revenue, but the
average revenue. However, with average revenues the e¤ects of a transfer would not be equal on
both teamsdemand functions as
R3 i
ti
6=  R
3 i
t3 i
:
15
The invariance result of Proposition 3 relies on the assumption of inelastic supply.
When supply is elastic, the same forces that drive wages down with xed supply are
still operational and, as a result, the overall amount of talent hired in equilibrium
decreases with revenue sharing. It is easy to show that under plausible conditions,
similar to the equilibria with w()  r, both teams will hire the less talent the
higher proportion of revenues are shared. However, competitive balance might go
up or down, depending on the specications of the revenue functions. Therefore,
while it often does, revenue sharing does not necessarily reduce the qualityof the
league, as the e¤ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance may compensate for
the lower aggregate talent level. In order to be able to carry out appropriate welfare
comparisons, we need to do a bit more work in the following section.
6 Benchmarking
In the previous section, we have obtained that revenue sharing will either not a¤ect
the talent distribution or  under plausible conditions  reduce the talent both
clubs hire. Additionally, revenue sharing always has an e¤ect on the distribution of
revenues between clubs and players. In this section we investigate the (utilitarian)
welfare consequences of these e¤ects.
Our approach makes it possible to measure any non-pecuniary e¤ects on members
and club owners in terms of dollars, U
i
V 0 . Also, in partial equilibrium, the players
preferences are captured by their reservation wage. As a benchmark we posit that
viewersand other customers purchase their league-related goods (TV broadcasts,
stadium tickets, merchandise,...) at their valuation, or equivalently, the planner
does not care about consumer surplus. This is sensible, as it is obvious that a
large (weight on) the consumer surplus will lead to more talent hired at the social
optimum. In sum, a useful welfare benchmark is the (dollar) sum of revenuesand
the reservation wages earned by non-employed players elsewhere.
Thus, we study the talent distribution
 bt1;bt2 that maximizes this total surplus,
Z1(t1; t2) + Z
2(t2; t1) + r(T   t2   t1): (8)
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We obtain crisp results when the following assumption is satised.
Assumption 3 At the social optimum (without consumer surplus) talent allocation bt1;bt2, the aggregate externality of marginally increasing the rivals talent level is
negative:24 Z12
 bt1;bt2+ Z22  bt2;bt1 < 0.
The derivatives of (8) with respect to t1 and t2 are
Z11(t1; t2) + Z
2
2(t2; t1)  r; (9)
Z12(t1; t2) + Z
2
1(t2; t1)  r:
Consider the case that it is socially optimal that all players are hired. Then, the
two expressions above are both non-negative. Next, note that an alternative way to
characterize the solution in this case is
t1 = argmax
t

Z1(t; T   t) + Z2(T   t; t)	 :
The rst-order condition for this problem can be written as Z11(t; T t) Z12(t; T t)
= Z21(T   t; t)  Z22(T   t; t). Taking into account that both expressions in (9) are
non-negative, we obtain that
Z11(t; T t) Z12(t; T t) = Z21(T t; t) Z22(T t; t)  r Z22(T t; t) Z12(t; T t):
(10)
Note that the left-hand side of the inequality is (3), the equation that characterizes
the market equilibrium when w  r. The right-hand side of (10) is in fact larger
than r if and only if Z12(t; T   t)+Z22(T   t; t) is negative, that is, when Assumption
3 is satised. Thus, we have shown that:
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 3, when it is e¢ cient to hire all the talent (even
without considering consumer surplus), the free market leads to the e¢ cient alloca-
tion.
24Assumption 1 already requires that both terms cannot be positive at the same talent distri-
bution. Additionally, note that, while it is possible that at very skewed levels of competitive
balance this aggregate externality is positive, it is practically impossible for it to be the case at
the e¢ cient talent distribution.
17
Thus, under the conditions of the proposition, no intervention in the market 
like revenue sharing  can improve welfare.25 As we mentioned before, the only
e¤ect is either a (utilitarian) welfare neutral redistribution of the proceeds, with
no change in aggregate surplus, or a reduction in the latter, when revenue sharing
is su¢ ciently strong as to reduce the amount of talent hired in the league.
Importantly, the market pressure for hiring talent can actually exceed the e¢ -
cient level. This can be seen when the socially optimal talent level is less than T .
Indeed, in this case we have that both expressions (9) are equal to zero at valuesbt1;bt2 such that bt1 + bt2 < T . Therefore, by Assumption 3
Z11(bt1;bt2)  Z12(bt1;bt2) = Z21(bt2;bt1)  Z22(bt2;bt1) = r   Z22(bt2;bt1)  Z12(bt1;bt2) > r;
so that, at the optimal talent distribution the willingness to pay of both clubs exceeds
r. As each of the sides of the rst equation above are continuous and downward
sloping in own talent, this means that there exists a lower wage, w0 and higher
talent levels, (t01; t
0
2) , where Z
1
1(t
0
1;bt2)  Z12(t01;bt2) = Z21(t02;bt1)  Z22(t02;bt1) = w0. Of
course, this does not characterize an equilibrium. But a su¢ cient condition for the
talent levels to increase is that they are strategic complements: an increase in the
opponents talent level increases the demand of any club Zii;3 i   Zi3 i;3 i > 0;
i = 1; 2. In that case, incorporating the dependence of the marginal revenue curves
on their second argument will increase them, leading to even higher talent levels
(and wages).26 This is what the next proposition states.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 3 and Zii;3 i(ti; t3 i)   Zi3 i;3 i(ti; t3 i) > 0 for
ti 2 [bti; t0i], i = 1; 2, when the socially optimal talent level (without consumer surplus)
is less than T , the free market leads to excess hiring.
Then, revenue sharing may be benecial, exactly because it can lower the talent
level. An obvious situation where this happens is when w > r, but the e¢ cient
25Note that this result does not depend on r being positive, so it also holds if the planner does
not care about the unemployed.
26Of course this is very strong: it would be su¢ cient that the loss of talent level in the second
step is less than the gain in the rst one.
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talent level is below T .27 The intuition is that, in the unregulated equilibrium, clubs
hire too much talent in order to gain a competitive edge over the rival club. It is the
internalization of this externality that revenue sharing allows clubs to accomplish.
Alternatively, we could also think of the excesshiring implied by Proposition
5 as capturing (part of) the talent level enhancing e¤ect of the ignored consumer
surplus.
7 Conclusion
We have proposed a new modelling framework for the analysis of labor markets in
professional sports. We have concentrated on three ingredients, the clubsand the
social planners objectives and the microstructure of the market itself. There are
a number of considerations that we have not addressed, despite their importance.
One of them is that the result that initial ownership does not matter (Corollary 1)
crucially depends on the Coasian nature of bargaining. If there are frictions, like
switching costs28 or asymmetric information, then they introduce a wedge which
needs careful analysis (c.f. Burguet et al., 2002).
We have also abstracted away from credit market imperfections and asymmetries.
To the extent that revenue sharing works in practice, it is likely to operate through
the alleviation of those.
An additional concern could be raised with the incorporation of an increasing
supply curve. The market would lead to the low reserve wage units of talent to be
hired rst. Would the clubs then coordinate on hiring the players with low talent?
Reassuringly, the answer is no. High talent players are the ones with low per unit
reseravtion wage. Just think of Lionel Messi (whose base salary is over $30 million):
27More generally, keeping the rivals talent level constant, revenue sharing would clearly decrease
the marginal revenues (point by point). Talent levels being strategic complements in this range,
would imply that incorporating the fact that the opponents talent level has actually decreased,
gives a further reason to decrease the talent hired. So the solution to (4) would occur at lower ts.
28Note that these are distinct from transfer fees, which are just the price.
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his reservation wage per (e¢ ciency) unit of talent is practically zero the minimum
wage divided by (nearly) innity.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. We proceed in two steps. First, we show that, in equilibrium, there are at
most two wage levels paid; and if there are two, one of them must be the reservation
wage.
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Assume, by way of contradiction, that in equilibrium a measure  > 0 of players
accept o¤ers in [a; b] and a positive measure of players accept o¤ers in [c; d] for some
r < a  b < c  d. Note that (almost) all players receiving these o¤ers must
be receiving the same o¤er from both clubs, as in the absence of competition for
a player the club hiring the player will benet from deviating and o¤er instead r.
Take a club that hires a positive measure  > 0 of players for wage(s) in [c; d].
Similarly, denote by  2 [0; ] the measure of players this same club hires for wages
in [a; b]. Assume rst that  < , and  >    . Suppose that our club deviates
and increases by " all its o¤ers in [a; b], and at the same time withdraws o¤ers in
[c; d] so as to reduce by    the hires at those wages. Note that a set of o¤ers that
leads to this result can always be identied given the rival o¤ers and each players
probability of acceptance. This deviation has no e¤ect on the amount of players
hired by the either club, but it reduces the wage bill by at least (c  b)(  ) ".
Given b, c, , and , we can always nd an " > 0 so that this reduction in the wage
bill is indeed positive, and so the deviation protable. Assume now that  <  and
 <   , and consider a similar deviation, where our club withdraws all its o¤ers
in [c; d] and increases by " a measure of its o¤ers in [a; b] so as to hire  more of these
players. Again, note that a set of these o¤ers can always be determined given the
rivals o¤ers and the players strategies. This deviation has no e¤ect on the amount
of players hired by either club, but it represents a reduction in the wage bill of at
least (c   b)   ". Again, we can always nd an " > 0 that makes this number
positive. Finally, if  = , then we can consider the other club, and repeating the
same argument nd a protable deviation for that club. This proves that, indeed,
there could be at most one wage other than r paid to hired players in equilibrium.
Next, we show that there cannot be two di¤erent wages paid in equilibrium. We
have shown that one of these wages has to be r. Moreover, repeating the argument in
the previous paragraph, this also requires that one clubs hires at r are uncontested
whereas all hires at the larger wage are contested . That would imply that the
club not hiring these players would not prefer to outbid the club that does hire
them. But we know that its marginal valuation for contested players is at least the
other wage paid and that it is strictly above r, so, by the continuity of the revenue
22
function, this cannot be.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. Suppose w > r, and suppose that Club 2 o¤ers every player a wage w.
Club 1s best response amounts to choosing howmuch talent t1 to hire at wage w (or
perhaps innitesimally above w) letting the rest of talent T t1 go to the rival. The
optimal choice satises the rst-order condition Z11(t
; T   t) Z12(t; T   t) = w,
that we already know that has a (unique) solution, conrming that we indeed have
an equilibrium. Now consider any other pair of potential equilibrium strategies,
such that all hired talent receive a by Proposition 1 common wage w < w. This
cannot involve full employment: taking into account that Zi1(ti; T ti) Zi2(ti; T ti)
is decreasing in ti, for at least one of the two clubs, Zi1(ti; T ti) Zi2(ti; T ti) > w,
and so the club is better o¤ slightly increasing the wage in some of its o¤ers (so as to
increase its talent and reduce the rivals). If total employment is reduced from T to
E, then by Assumption 2 Zi1(ti; T ti) Zi2(ti; T ti) < Zi1(ti; E ti) Zi2(ti; E ti),
i = 1; 2. Since the equilibrium wage still has to equal marginal revenue, it must be
higher than w.29
Now suppose that w  r and there exist t1; t2, both strictly positive,30 that
satisfy max fZi1(ti; t3 i)  Zi2(ti; t3 i); Zi1(ti; t3 i)g = r for i = 1; 2. Suppose that
Zi2(ti; t3 i)  0 at this solution, for i = 1; 2. Consider the strategy prole where
both clubs make employment o¤ers at wage r to the same t1 + t2 players, and each
of the players who receive o¤ers accept Club is one with probability ti
t1+t2
. This is
an equilibrium: making o¤ers at wage at least r for uncontested talent does not
increase prots, and neither does making fewer o¤ers or making o¤ers with higher
wages for contested talent increase prots. Now assume that Z12(t1; t2) > 0 (and so
Z22(t2; t1) < 0 by Assumption 1), and consider the strategy prole where Club 1 uses
the same strategy, Club 2 only makes o¤ers for t2 of that talent, and every player
that receives two o¤ers all with wage r accepts the one from Club 2. Once again,
neither club or players prots from any deviation, and so indeed an equilibrium
29For completenesssake: note that we cannot have uncontested o¤ers accepted in equilibrium
as the aggregate contested demand exceeds E.
30If ti = 0, then in equilibrium t3 i must also be zero, sin revenues are zero for any value of t3 i.
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with wage r exists. Finally, note that no equilibrium with (accepted) o¤ers below
r exists, since a players acceptance of such o¤ers is a strictly dominated strategy.
So, the equilibrium with wage r is the one with lowest wage.
A su¢ cient condition for (4) to have a solution is that r < mini [max fZi1(0; T )  Zi2(0; T ); Zi1(0; T )g].
Indeed, when the condition is satised there always exists a solution in [0; T ] to the
system max fZi1(ti; t3 i)  Zi2(ti; t3 i); Zi1(ti; t3 i)g = r: each equation denes a con-
tinuous curve ti(t3 i) and t3 i(ti) with support [0; T ] and image in [0; T ]. Thus, the
two curves cross.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. Substituting the value of S1 and S2 into (6), we have
1
V 01
dU1(t1; T   t1)
dt1
+ 
dR1(t1; T   t1)
dt1
+ (1  )dR
2(T   t1; t1)
dt1
(11)
=   1
V 02
dU2(T   t1; t1)
dt1
  dR
2(T   t1; t1)
dt1
  (1  )dR
1(t1; T   t1)
dt1
= w():
Collecting terms,
1
V 01
dU1(t1; T   t1)
dt1
+
dR1(t1; T   t1)
dt1
=   1
V 02
dU2(T   t1; t1)
dt1
  dR
2(T   t1; t1)
dt1
(12)
= w() + (1  )

dR1(t1; T   t1)
dt1
  dR
2(T   t1; t1)
dt1

;
and recalling that Zij(ti; t3 i) =
1
V 0i
@U i(ti;t3 i)
@tj
+ @R
i(ti;t3 i)
@tj
, yields
Z11(t1; T   t1)  Z12(t1; T   t1) = Z21(t1; T   t1)  Z22(t1; T   t1); (13)
for any . This equation is (3), so the equilibrium talent distribution, (t; T   t)
is unchanged by revenue sharing. That is, the rst line of (12) is independent of .
The last equality in (12) then characterizes the equilibrium wage, w(). Finally
note that, when w > r, dR
1(t1;T t1)
dt1
> 0 and dR
2(T t1;t1)
dt1
< 0, so w() is indeed
increasing.
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